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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Ylli Gjeli and Fatmir Mustafaraj were tried together 
and convicted of a number of racketeering-related offenses in 
connection with a loan sharking and illegal gambling 
operation in Philadelphia.  The District Court entered 
preliminary orders of forfeiture making both men jointly and 
severally liable for more than $5 million of the proceeds from 
the criminal operation.  Gjeli and Mustafaraj appeal the 
forfeiture orders and their sentences.  During the pendency of 
this appeal, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
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Honeycutt v. United States, reviewing one of the forfeiture 
statutes at issue here and holding that joint and several 
liability is unauthorized.  137 S. Ct. 1626, 1630 (2017).  In 
light of that holding, we will remand this case for the District 
Court to reconsider the forfeiture orders.  As to all other 
issues on appeal, we will affirm. 
 
I.  Background 
 
 In August 2013, a grand jury in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania returned a 26-count indictment against nine co-
defendants, including Gjeli and Mustafaraj.  The indictment 
described a violent criminal enterprise, in operation since at 
least 2002, that made money for its members through “loan 
sharking, extortion, illegal gambling, and the collection of 
unlawful debts[.]”1  (App. at 106.)  Gjeli was a “leader and 
‘boss’ of the enterprise who directed other members in the 
loan sharking activities and illegal gambling business.”  (App. 
at 110.)  Mustafaraj was a “leader and ‘muscle’ in the 
enterprise who regularly assisted … Gjeli and directed other 
members” of the enterprise.  (Id.)   
                                              
1 The loan sharking portion of the enterprise worked 
by lending large sums of cash at extreme interest rates, the 
majority of which were between 104% and 156% per year, 
but which were sometimes as high as 395% per year.  The 
defendants would exert pressure on loan recipients who were 
unable to make payments, including by visiting their homes 
and places of employment, and threatening violence.  The 
gambling business involved sports betting and significantly 
overlapped with the loan sharking, as the gamblers were often 
in need of funds.   
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 The indictment charged all of the co-defendants with 
being members of a RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1962(d).  Gjeli and Mustafaraj were also charged 
with a number of other crimes stemming from the enterprise.  
Five of the defendants eventually pled guilty, and four, 
including Gjeli and Mustafaraj, went to trial.  The jury found 
Gjeli guilty on ten counts and Mustafaraj guilty on twelve.2  
The jury did not, however, convict on all counts.  In 
particular, it acquitted Gjeli and Mustafaraj of making an 
extortionate extension of credit, which was charged in Count 
13, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of 
                                              
2 Gjeli was found guilty of racketeering conspiracy in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count 1); collection of 
unlawful debt, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Counts 4, 
10, 11); making extortionate extensions of credit, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 892 (Counts 14 to 16); collection of extensions 
of credit by extortionate means, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 894(a)(1) (Counts 23 and 24); and operating an illegal 
gambling business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (Count 
25).     
Mustafaraj was found guilty of racketeering 
conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count 1); 
collection of unlawful debt, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(c) (Counts 3, 7, 9, 11, 12); making extortionate 
extensions of credit, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 892 (Counts 
14 to 16); collection of extensions of credit by extortionate 
means, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894(a)(1) (Counts 22 and 
24); and operating an illegal gambling business, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (Count 25).   
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violence, which was charged in Count 26.3  Those specific 
counts were based on an incident involving Anthony Rodi, a 
loan recipient with a gambling problem.  Rodi testified at trial 
that, in January 2011, when he asked Mustafaraj and Gjeli for 
money, they wielded an axe and threatened that higher-ups in 
their organization in New York would cut Rodi’s arm off if 
he was unable to pay back the loan.  Rodi said that Gjeli then 
instructed Mustafaraj to “go and get it” (App. at 2445), and 
Mustafaraj left and returned with a firearm that Gjeli pointed 
at Rodi’s head.  A co-defendant, George Markakis, who ran 
the sports betting side of the RICO enterprise, testified that he 
had expressed concern about Rodi’s mounting debts from 
football betting in 2012, but that Mustafaraj had assured him 
“they had [Rodi] under control and not to worry about it.”  
(App. at 3589.)  Markakis told the jury that Mustafaraj 
explained that he (Mustafaraj) and Gjeli had “scared” Rodi 
with “a machete and a pistol.”  (App. at 3589.)   
 
 At the sentencing hearings for each man, the District 
Court announced its conclusions under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, after working through calculations 
involving the grouping of offenses.  The imprisonment range 
for both turned out to be 135 to 168 months.  Gjeli was 
sentenced to 168 months and Mustafaraj to 147.   
 
  The Indictment had contained notices of forfeiture for 
the charges of engaging in a racketeering conspiracy, making 
extortionate credit transactions, illegal gambling, and 
possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence.  
Pursuant to Rule 32.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
                                              
3 Gjeli was also acquitted on Count 18, the collection 
of an extension of credit by extortionate means.   
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Procedure, those notices alerted Gjeli and Mustafaraj that the 
government could seek forfeiture at sentencing in the event of 
conviction on those counts.  Following the verdicts, the 
government filed motions seeking preliminary orders of 
forfeiture.  The District Court granted those motions, and 
neither Gjeli nor Mustafaraj objected to the entry of the 
preliminary orders.  At each man’s sentencing hearing, the 
District Court made statements regarding forfeiture, but the 
judgments themselves did not reference the forfeiture orders.   
 
II.  Discussion4 
 
 The Defendants raise three issues on appeal.  First, 
they dispute the application of a dangerous weapon 
enhancement that was used to calculate their Guidelines 
range.  Second, they argue that the calculation of their base 
offense level under the Guidelines’ grouping provisions was 
incorrect.  Finally, they raise a number of challenges to the 
District Court’s entry of the forfeiture orders.  We address 
each of those issues in turn. 
 
                                              
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 A. Application of Sentencing Enhancement5 
 
Gjeli and Mustafaraj argue that the District Court 
violated the Constitution by considering at sentencing their 
use of an axe to threaten Anthony Rodi.  In their view, 
making that incident the basis of a dangerous weapons 
enhancement to their sentencing range was contrary to the 
Sixth Amendment.6  They say that the use of the axe 
constitutes acquitted conduct because it was one of the acts 
that formed the basis of Count 26, of which they were found 
not guilty.7  Citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
                                              
5 Our review of the Defendants’ Sixth Amendment 
challenge to the imposition of the sentencing enhancement is 
plenary, as it is a question of law.  United States v. Barbosa, 
271 F.3d 438, 452 (3d Cir. 2001).   
 
6 Specifically, the Court applied the sentencing 
enhancement delineated in United States Sentencing 
Guidelines § 2E2.1(b)(1)(B), which states that: “if a 
dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was … used, 
increase [the offense level] by 4 levels[.]”   
 
7 Count 26 charges Mustafaraj and Gjeli with having: 
knowingly possessed a firearm in furtherance of 
a crime of violence for which the defendants 
may be prosecuted in a court of the United 
States, that is, Count One of this indictment, 
which charged Racketeering Conspiracy, in that 
the conspiracy involved Making Extortionate 
Extensions of Credit, in violation of Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 892, and 
Collections of Extensions of Credit By 
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(2000), they contend that relying on acquitted conduct 
violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.  Their 
argument is unavailing. 
 
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of a right to trial by jury means that 
“any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  530 U.S. at 490.  
The Court has applied Apprendi numerous times, in each case 
concluding “that the defendant’s constitutional rights had 
been violated because the judge had imposed a sentence 
greater than the maximum he could have imposed … without 
the challenged factual finding.”  Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491-97, 
and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 603-09 (2002)).  What has 
come to be called an Apprendi violation thus occurs whenever 
an enhanced sentence exceeds the statutory maximum that 
could have been imposed without application of the 
enhancement.  See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (“Our precedents 
make clear … that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi 
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely 
                                                                                                     
Extortionate Means, in violation of Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 894(a)(1); and 
Count Thirteen of this indictment, which 
charged Making an Extortionate Extension of 
Credit, in violation of Title 18, United States 
Code, Sections 894(a)(1) and 2, to Customer 
#8, a person known to the grand jury; and the 
defendants brandished that firearm. 
(App. at 178.) 
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on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or 
admitted by the defendant.” (emphasis omitted)).   
 
No Apprendi error occurred here.  Neither Gjeli nor 
Mustafaraj complain that the sentences they received went 
beyond the statutory maximum to which they were exposed, 
and clearly their sentences do not.8  Their argument, rather, is 
                                              
8 In light of its holding in Apprendi, the Supreme Court 
in United States v. Booker recognized that sentencing 
enhancements that increase an applicable Guidelines range 
would likewise offend the Sixth Amendment if the Guidelines 
were treated as mandatory in sentencing decisions.  543 U.S. 
220, 232-33 (2005).  The Court therefore held that the 
Guidelines are not mandatory and instead must be considered 
advisory.  Id. at 245.  We have explained that, since Booker, 
“the final Guidelines range does not bind the district court, 
but merely serves as one of a number of factors to be 
considered in fashioning the ultimate sentence.”  United 
States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 564-65 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60).  And the facts found by 
the district court in imposing a sentencing enhancement do 
not “have the effect of increasing the maximum punishment 
to which the defendant is exposed.”  Id. (citing Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 489-94).  Therefore, unless the sentence exceeded the 
statutory maximum chosen by Congress in the United States 
Code, the sentence is not unconstitutional.  Id.; see United 
States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 735 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(recognizing that the “Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is 
not implicated by fact finding during a sentencing proceeding 
unless those facts increase the statutory maximum 
punishment” (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490)).     
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that the District Court’s application of the dangerous weapon 
enhancement for use of the axe was a violation of their Sixth 
Amendment rights because it relied on acquitted conduct.  
But that argument ignores that they were never charged with 
a crime for which the use of an axe was an element.  The only 
count against Gjeli and Mustafaraj that has as an element 
anything to do with a weapon was Count 26, which charged 
them with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of 
violence.9  True enough, they were acquitted on that charge, 
and it is also true that the alleged firearm crime happened to 
have occurred during the same incident in which the axe was 
used.  But that does not mean that the acquittal was about the 
                                              
9 Neither Count 13, of which Gjeli and Mustafaraj 
were acquitted, nor Count 18, of which Gjeli was acquitted 
(Mustafaraj was not charged in Count 18), had use of 
weapons as an element.  The charge in Count 13, making an 
extortionate extension of credit, requires that the defendant 
made “any extortionate extension of credit, or conspire[d] to 
do so.”  18 U.S.C. § 892(a); see United States v. Giampa, 758 
F.2d 928, 933 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that an extortionate 
extension of credit in turn requires “an ‘understanding of the 
creditor and debtor at the time [the extension of credit] is 
made that delay in making repayment or failure to make 
repayment could result in the use of violence or other 
criminal means to cause harm’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 891(6)) 
(alteration in Giampa)).  The charge in Count 18, collection 
of credit by extortionate means, has the following elements: 
(a) “knowingly participat[ing] in any way,” (b) “in the use of 
any extortionate means[,]” (c) “to collect or attempt to collect 
any extension of credit, or to punish any person for the 
nonrepayment thereof[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 894(a).   
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axe.  It was not, because the charge itself was not about the 
axe.  In short, use of the axe was never charged and therefore 
did not constitute conduct of which they were acquitted.   
 
Even if the District Court in its discretion had relied on 
acquitted conduct, though, “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does 
not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct 
underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has 
been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.”  United 
States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 735-36 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(quoting United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997)).  
That is because “the jury cannot be said to have necessarily 
rejected any facts when it returns a general verdict of not 
guilty.”  Watts, 519 U.S. at 155.  The District Court here had 
ample basis for deciding by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the dangerous weapon enhancement should apply, given 
that “the testimony [by Mr. Rodi] with reference to the [axe] 
… was corroborated by Mr. Markakis.”  (App. at 5243-44.)   
 
“We find no clear error in the District Court’s factual 
findings because there is sufficient evidence in the record to 
support the finding” that a dangerous weapon, namely the 
axe, was used.10  Ciavarella, 716 F.3d at 736.  Therefore, the 
                                              
10 The Guidelines define a dangerous weapon, in part, 
as “an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily 
injury[.]”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. (n.1(D)).  An axe is 
undoubtedly such an instrument, and the District Court 
determined that by a preponderance of the evidence.  (See 
App. at 5244 (“Obviously, the [axe] is such a dangerous 
weapon, and [the] use of it to threaten the witness calls for the 
application of the four-point enhancement.”).)   
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argument that the District Court’s application of the 
dangerous weapon enhancement violated the Sixth 
Amendment fails.   
 
 B. RICO Grouping under the Guidelines 
 
 The Sentencing Guidelines lay out a method for 
determining a numerical offense level for federal crimes, 
which, when combined with a defendant’s criminal history 
score, yield a sentencing range.  The base offense level for a 
RICO conspiracy is the greater of either 19 or the level 
applicable to the underlying racketeering activity.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1.  To calculate the latter number, we must 
launch on a journey through the Guidelines’ labyrinthine 
provisions for grouping offenses.  A sentencing court “treat[s] 
each underlying offense as if contained in a separate count of 
conviction ... .”  Id. § 2E1.1, cmt. (n.1).  After identifying the 
underlying racketeering offenses the court then groups 
together closely related ones, in accordance with Chapter 3 of 
the Guidelines.  Id. § 3D1.2.  Once those offenses are 
grouped, the court assigns a base offense level to each 
“Group” based on the nature of the grouping and of the 
offenses grouped.  Id. § 3D1.3.  In assigning the base offense 
level to each Group, the court looks to the highest offense 
level of the underlying offenses in that Group.  Id. § 3D1.3.   
 
 After the offense level has been determined for each 
Group, the sentencing court must then determine the 
combined offense level of all the Groups.  To do so, the court 
“tak[es] the offense level applicable to the Group with the 
highest offense level and increas[es] that offense level by the 
amount indicated” in a table included in the Guidelines.  Id. 
§ 3D1.4.  That table requires the court to assign “Units” to 
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each Group.  Id.  One Unit is assigned to the Group with the 
highest offense level.  Id. § 3D1.4(a).  Then, one additional 
Unit is added “for each Group that is equally serious or from 
1 to 4 levels less serious” than the Group with the highest 
offense level.  Id.  And one-half Unit is added for “any Group 
that is 5 to 8 levels less serious than the Group with the 
highest offense level.”  Id. § 3D1.4(b).  “[A]ny Group that is 
9 or more levels less serious than the Group with the highest 
offense level” is to be disregarded.  Id. § 3D1.4(c).  Based on 
the total number of Units, the base offense level can be 
increased up to a maximum of 5 levels, if the sum of the 
Units is 5 or greater.  Id. § 3D1.4. 
 
 For both Gjeli and Mustafaraj, the highest offense 
level applicable to the groupings was 28, and the groupings’ 
Units aggregated to 8.5 Units.  So a 5 level increase in 
offense level was added to 28, making the total offense level 
for each man 33.   
 
 Mustafaraj makes two arguments with respect to the 
District Court’s calculation of his offense level.  First, he 
claims that the District Court erred by declining to decide a 
“contested issue” (Mustafaraj Br. at 36), namely whether he 
had participated in criminal acts that were designated as 
Groups 10, 11, and 12 in the calculation.  Second, he argues 
that, even if he had participated in those crimes, the District 
Court erred by including Groups 10, 11, and 12 in the 
calculation at all.  Gjeli joins that second argument.  Our 
review of the District Court’s calculations is plenary.11  See 
                                              
11 Gjeli did not waive that second argument and 
therefore our review is plenary as to the alleged error 
affecting him, but Mustafaraj’s counsel (rightly) agreed with 
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United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en 
banc) (“[T]his Court will … exercise plenary review over a 
district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines.”).   
 
 As to the first argument, Mustafaraj says that the 
District Court should have ruled on the exclusion of the 
contested Groups pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 32.  That Rule requires a sentencing court to “rule 
on [any disputed portion of a presentence report] or determine 
that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not 
affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the 
matter in sentencing[.]”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).  The 
Rule is “strictly enforced[,]”  United States v. Electrodyne 
Sys. Corp., 147 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 1998), and the District 
Court here did as instructed: it found that the precise 
objection “[would] not affect sentencing.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32(i)(3)(B).  That satisfies Rule 32.  Cf. United States v. 
Campbell, 295 F.3d 398, 406 (3d Cir. 2002) (declining to find 
a Rule 32 violation where a party raised his objections for the 
first time at sentencing and the sentencing court ruled on 
them on the record). 
 
                                                                                                     
the District Court that it was not necessary to rule on the 
inclusion of Groups 10, 11, and 12 in the sentencing 
calculation.  His challenges therefore need only be reviewed 
for plain error.  See United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 
253, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (reviewing unpreserved 
procedural challenges to a sentence for plain error).  As the 
District Court’s rulings on these issues survive plenary 
review, however, it is clear that they do not constitute plain 
error.   
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 Mustafaraj’s second argument, the one joined by Gjeli, 
is that the District Court should have excluded the contested 
Groups altogether.  Even if that argument had merit, however, 
it is irrelevant.  As the District Court pointed out, excluding 
the contested Groups would not have affected the resulting 
Guidelines range for either man because, even without them, 
each was subject to the five-level increase based on the 
remaining Groups affecting his sentence.  (See App. at 5097 
(recognizing that even if the District Court excluded the 
Groups “that would only delete two units, so [the defendant] 
would still have 6.5 units, and therefore, there would be a 
five-point enhancement”).)  Therefore, the Court’s conclusion 
that ruling on the matter was unnecessary was sufficient.  
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).  Furthermore, any error in this 
regard – and we are not implying there was any – was 
harmless, as it did not affect either man’s sentence.12  See 
                                              
12 Mustafaraj also argues that the District Court erred 
in failing to strike a reference to guns in paragraph 178 of his 
Pre-Sentence Report.  The government agrees that that was a 
clerical error but notes that it can be resolved at any time by 
motion to the District Court through Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 36.  Rule 36 states that “the court may at any time 
correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of 
the record, or correct an error in the record arising from 
oversight or omission.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.  Because we 
agree that any clerical error is properly the subject of a Rule 
36 motion to the District Court, United States v. Bennett, 423 
F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2005), we do not address it on appeal.  
Mustafaraj’s additional argument that his Bureau of 
Prisons’ classification was potentially affected by the PSR is 
irrelevant to our review of the sentence imposed.  Williams v. 
United States, 503 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1992) (“[R]emand is 
17 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“Any error ... that does not affect 
substantial rights must be disregarded.”).  We thus reject 
Mustafaraj and Gjeli’s challenges to the calculations 
associated with the RICO conspiracy.  
 
 C. Forfeiture  
 
 Gjeli and Mustafaraj argue that the District Court 
never announced the amount of forfeiture at sentencing and 
failed to include a final order of forfeiture in the judgment, as 
required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
32.2(b)(4)(B).13  The government takes a different view of the 
                                                                                                     
required only if the sentence was imposed as a result of an 
incorrect application of the Guidelines.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis added)); see also United States v. 
Wilken, 498 F.3d 1160, 1170 n.9 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Precedent 
is clear … that we determine whether a sentencing error is 
harmless with reference only to the sentence imposed.” 
(citing Williams)). 
 
13 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(4)(B) 
governs “Notice [of Forfeiture] and Inclusion in the 
Judgment.”  It states that:  
 
The court must include the forfeiture when 
orally announcing the sentence or must 
otherwise ensure that the defendant knows of 
the forfeiture at sentencing. The court must also 
include the forfeiture order, directly or by 
reference, in the judgment, but the court’s 
failure to do so may be corrected at any time 
under Rule 36. 
18 
 
record and contends that the District Court did ensure that 
both men knew of the forfeiture at sentencing, although the 
government does agree that the Court failed to include the 
final order of forfeiture in the judgment.  Indeed, a review of 
the judgments confirms that a clerical error occurred – the 
forfeiture orders are not included – so we must at least 
remand for the District Court to correct that error under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.14   
 
 In addition to that problem, the parties agree that 
forfeiture was imposed jointly and severally and that such 
liability is no longer permissible in light of Honeycutt v. 
United States.  137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017).  Neither Gjeli nor 
Mustafaraj objected to joint and several liability, and the 
District Court quite rightly relied on our then-controlling 
decision in United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 1999), 
in imposing that form of liability.15  That, however, was 
                                              
14 See n.12, supra, for the relevant text of Rule 36.   
 
15 Because Gjeli and Mustafaraj did not object to the 
preliminary orders of forfeiture below, those claims would 
ordinarily be subject to plain error review.  United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993).  Here, however, there was 
an intervening change in the law that provided a basis for 
appeal that did not exist at the time the District Court ruled on 
the preliminary orders of forfeiture.  See Hamling v. United 
States, 418 U.S. 87, 102 (1974) (“[A] change in the law 
occurring after a relevant event in a case will be given effect 
while the case is on direct review.”); see also McLaughlin v. 
Wohlgemuth, 535 F.2d 251, 254 (3d Cir. 1976) (vacating and 
remanding for district court to reconsider opinion in light of 
intervening law).   
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before the Supreme Court decided Honeycutt.  In Honeycutt, 
the text and structure of 21 U.S.C. § 853 led the Court to 
conclude that a defendant cannot “be held jointly and 
severally liable for property that his co-conspirator derived 
from the crime but that the defendant himself did not 
acquire.”  137 S. Ct. at 1630.  That holding effectively 
overturns our decision in Pitt.  Id. at 1631 n.1.   
 
 The statute at issue in Honeycutt was the basis for 
forfeiture for certain counts of conviction in this case, and 
therefore obviously affects the forfeiture ruling here.  And 
while the forfeiture based on other counts of conviction was 
rooted in a different criminal forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1963, and in a civil forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 981(a)(1)(C), a review of the text and structure of those 
statutes reveals that they are substantially the same as the one 
under consideration in Honeycutt.16  We thus see no reason 
                                              
16 A review of the applicable forfeiture statutes 
demonstrates the substantial equivalency in both structure and 
text.   
 
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), which pertains to the racketeering 
conspiracy (Count 1), states that:  
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 
of this chapter … shall forfeit to the United 
States, irrespective of any provision of State law 
… 
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, 
any proceeds which the person obtained, 
directly or indirectly, from racketeering 
activity or unlawful debt collection in 
violation of section 1962. 
20 
 
why the holding in Honeycutt does not apply with equal force 
to those statutes.  Joint and several liability therefore cannot 
be imposed in these cases.  Instead, “[f]orfeiture … is limited 
to property [each] defendant himself actually acquired as the 
result of the crime.”  Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 1635.  We will 
                                                                                                     
 
18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1), which pertains to extortionate 
extensions of credit (Counts 13-24) and illegal gambling 
(Count 25), states that: 
The following property is subject to forfeiture 
to the United States: 
(C) Any property, real or personal, which 
constitutes or is derived from proceeds 
traceable to a violation of [certain sections] 
of this title or any offense constituting 
“specified unlawful activity” (as defined in 
section 1956(c)(7) of this title), or a 
conspiracy to commit such offense. 
 
21 U.S.C. § 853(a), which became relevant through the 
government’s desire to seek substitute property pursuant to 21 
U.S.C. § 853(p) for each count for which forfeiture was 
sought, United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 202 
(3d Cir. 2006), states that: 
Any person convicted of a violation of this 
subchapter … shall forfeit to the United States, 
irrespective of any provision of State law-- 
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, 
any proceeds the person obtained, directly 
or indirectly, as the result of such 
violation[.]  
 
21 
 
therefore remand for the District Court to reconsider its 
forfeiture rulings and include any final orders of forfeiture in 
the final written judgment as to each defendant.  
 
III.  Conclusion  
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
vacate and remand in part.   
